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PRE-ENFORCEMENT REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
ACTION: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RIPENESS DOCTRINE
I. Introduction
Individuals and corporations in the United States are increasingly the target
of various actions instituted by federal administrative agencies. These admin-
istrative actions range from the announcement of formal regulations to mere
statements of general opinion. Frequently, an agency's action conflicts with the
private interests of those subject to its authority. Accordingly, these conflicts
necessitate a review procedure in which an affected party may challenge the
agency's action. The statutes creating the various agencies often provide a means
of reviewing administrative action within the agency itself.' If such review is
not available or if the result of the administrative review procedure seems un-
favorable to the affected party, resort may be had to the judiciary.
Should appeal be made to the judiciary, the affected party must choose
between two alternatives. The party may choose not to comply with the agency's
action and thereby obtain review of the action's validity when the agency files
suit to compel enforcement. Alternatively, the party may, in a limited number
of situations, bring the matter before the courts immediately. This limited area
of immediate review is known as pre-enforcement review.' This note will examine
the current availability of federal pre-enforcement review and identify which
types of agency actions are and are not appropriate for such review.' Ad-
ditionally, a new approach to the decision to grant or to deny pre-enforcement
review will be suggested.
II. Ripeness As the Prerequisite for Pre-enforcement Review
Pre-enforcement review is closely linked to the doctrine of "ripeness for
review." 4 Ripeness is a broad concept in administrative law which has been
often discussed by the authorities in the field.' In essence, the ripeness of an issue
for judicial review concerns the appropriate time for judicial review of agency
action.' As such, ripeness concerns itself not with the issue of whether an affected
1 See, e.g., Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act §§ 701 (e)-(f), 21 U.S.C. §§ 371
(e)-(f) (1964).
2 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1966); Administrative Procedure Act,
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964); Declaratory Judgement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
3 For an analysis of the availability of pre-enforcement review of formal agency regula-
tions see, Comment, Pre-enforcement Review of Administrative Regulations, 42 S. CAL L. REV.
505 (1969).
4 See generally 3 DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 21.01 (1958 & cumm. supps.)
[hereinafter cited as DAvIs]; Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1966).
5 See DAVIS at 21.01; Fuchs, Prerequisites to judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Action, 51 IND. L.J. 817 (1976) ; Vinning, Direct judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness
in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (1971); L. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINSTRATiVE ACTION, c. 10 (1965).
6 An appropriate agency action must meet the minimum requirements of formality and
finality specified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1964). It must also
be assumed at the outset that the party seeking review has established a justiciable case and
controversy and sufficient standing for a reviewing court to acquire jurisdiction. Although the
doctrine of standing is beyond the scope of this note, courts sometimes rely on this doctrine to
preclude review. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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party will obtain review but rather, when such review will be granted.
To be distinguished from the ripeness issue is the doctrine of "exhaustion of
administrative remedies." Exhaustion too, concerns itself with the timing of
judicial review of administrative action. Exhaustion of remedies, however, is a
more limited, procedurally oriented concept than is the doctrine of ripeness. The
exhaustion issue involves the question of whether an issue of conflict should be
channeled through the administrative process, toward an administrative remedy,
before being considered by the courts. Thus, the availability of judicial review is
affected only by the time required to channel an issue through the remaining
administrative review processes.
The concept of ripeness, however, is broader in focus.7 Ripeness concerns
itself with the more abstract aspect of the judicial process. It is an attempt to
determine at what stage the courts should attempt to resolve developing conflicts
among parties. A reviewing court must ask whether sufficient events have taken
place to solidify the adverse positions of the parties and remove the conflict
from the realm of the hypothetical, abstract, or remote. Review will be under-
taken only if the conflict has "ripened" in finality and formality to become
present, imminent and injurious. Whenever an agency action results in a con-
flict with the requisite finality, formality and injury prior to an enforcement
proceeding, the agency action is said to be ripe for pre-enforcement review.8 The
problem is determining the presence of these "requisites."
A. Development of Ripeness and Pre-enforcement Review
Before 1966 there was no definitive test to determine when and under what
circumstances pre-enforcement review should be granted. Generally, the courts
were reluctant to review agency action prior to enforcement. The rationale for
this view, as expressed by Justice Harlan, speaking for the Supreme Court in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,9 was to prevent the courts, ". . . from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies and also to
protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has
been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties."
The standards for pre-enforcement review prior to Abbott were ad hoc and
applied in limited areas. Through the Abbott and companion decisions, the
Supreme Court specifically addressed the issue of ripeness and pre-enforcement
review." The Abbott Court announced a bifurcated test to determine which
agency regulations could be challenged prior to an enforcement proceeding. In
holding that a labeling regulation promulgated by the Commissioner of the
7 DA vs at 21.01.
8 If the action is not sufficiently "ripe" for pre-enforcement review it would become
"ripe" during the enforcement proceeding initiated by the agency. Accordingly, the affected
party could then obtain "enforcement review" of the "ripened" issues.
9 387 U.S. at 148.
10 The courts had developed a variety of tests for pre-enforcement review. See, e.g.,
Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956) (immediate and practical impact);
Columbia System v. U.S., 316 U.S. 407 '(1942) (to avoid irreparable injury); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (to avoid present and real injury).
11 387 U.S. 136 (1966); Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1966); Gardner v.
Toilet Goods Assn. 387 U.S. 167 (1966).
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FDA was ripe for pre-enforcement review, the Court stated: "[T]he problem
[of ripeness for pre-enforcement review] is best seen in a two-fold aspect, requir-
ing us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hard-
ship to the parties of withholding court consideration."'"
The Court established two criteria to determine the "fitness" of particular
issues for pre-enforcement review: (1) whether the issue framed was "purely
legal" i.e. was the statute properly construed by the commissioner; and, (2)
whether the regulation was a "final agency action" that is, the definite and final
agency position on a particular issue."
On the issue of "hardship," the Abbott Court stated that the agency action
must place the party in a "dilemma."'" The "dilemma" requirement imposed by
the Abbott Court was further clarified by the Third Circuit in A.O. Smith v.
F.T.C.' In A.O. Smith, the Third Circuit weighed the costs of compliance and
the penalties for noncompliance with the FTC's implementation of a "Line of
Business" (LB) annual reporting regulation.' It was petitioner A. 0. Smith's
position that the reporting requirements of the LB program produced an im-
mediate hardship and thus placed it in the requisite dilemma. In holding that
there was sufficient hardship under the Abbott standard, the court stated:
Thus it appears from the Abbott Laboratories trilogy that one seeking dis-
cretionary relief may not obtain pre-enforcement review if there is no im-
mediate threat of sanctions for non compliance, or if the potential sanction
is de-minimis. Conversely, the court should find agency action ripe for
judicial review if the action is final and clear cut, and if it puts the com-
plaining party on the horns of a dilemma: if he complies and awaits ultimate
judicial determination of the action's validity, he must change his day to day
course of conduct... Alternatively, if he does not comply, he risks sanctions
or injuries including, for example, civil and criminal penalties, or loss of
public confidence.1
7
From these decisions it is possible to extract the present law concerning
ripeness for pre-enforcement review.' In the words of the Supreme Court:
12 387 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added).
13 Id.
14 Id. at 152.
15 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
16 The LB program was designed to increase the availability and accuracy of data on
industrial performance in specific areas of commercial activity. The program required certain
large corporations to provide sales and cost data with respect to specific lines of product
activity. The goal of the program was to provide more meaningful and understandable
corporate financial statements.
17 530 F.2d at 524.
18 The companion cases of the "Abbott Trilogy" were similarly decided. In Gardner v.
Toilet Goods Assn., 387 U.S. 167 (1966), the Court found the commissioner's regulations on
color additives and on the applicability of a hair dye statutory exemption ripe for pre-enforce-
ment review. Specific clearance by the commissioner was required of all "color additives"
to be used in food, drugs and cosmetics. The regulation at issue included "diluents" and
"any substance that results in coloring when applied to the human body" as "color additives"
requiring specific clearance. Noting that the regulations were self executing and that non-
compliance could result in seizures, injunctions, criminal and/or civil sanction, the Court
found sufficient degrees of "fitness" and "hardship" to grant review. In the third case of the
trilogy, Toilet Goods Assn. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1966), the Court held that although
the "fitness" test was satisfied, there was no "direct and immediate impact" or "hardship"
in the FDA regulation. The regulation in conflict allowed the commissioner to suspend the
"certification service" of a business if it denied FDA inspectors free access to inspect the
[December 1977]
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Where the legal issue presented is fit for judicial resolution and where a
regulation requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiff's
conduct of their affairs with serious penalties attached to non compliance,
access to the courts under the Administrative Procedure Act and the
Declaratory Judgement Act must be permitted, absent a statutory bar or
some other unusual circumstance...1
Obviously, under the Abbott holding, formal agency regulations which
satisfy the two pronged test are to be adjudged "ripe for pre-enforcement re-
view."2 Left open in Abbott, however, is the extent to which less formal agency
action may be considered ripe for pre-enforcement review. It is in this area of
less formal, less final action, coupled with varying degrees of hardship, that the
courts have had the most difficulty in applying the Abbott standards.2 '
B. Application of the Abbott Standards
Since the decision in-Abbott, there have been no pronouncements by the
Supreme Court on the issue of ripeness for pre-enforcement review. For the past
eleven years, the federal district and circuit courts have applied the Abbott
standards to all forms of administrative agency actions to determine which are
appropriate for pre-enforcement review. Indeed, the current state of the doctrine
has been labeled "a stable and satisfactory ripeness law.., largely the opposite
of what it was under the Supreme Court's decisions of the 1940's and 1950's when
the Court was rendering extreme decisions closing the judicial doors, even when
plaintiffs were seriously hurt by onerous legal uncertainties."22 While it is true
that the availability of pre-enforcement review has been expanded since the
1950's, a review of the post Abbott cases reveals that "legal uncertainties" in the
doctrine of pre-enforcement review continue to plague persons seeking relief from
federal administrative agency action.2"
To understand these legal uncertainties it is helpful to analyze the variety of
agency actions in terms of a spectrum of "pre-enforcement reviewability." On
the "consistently reviewable" end of the spectrum are the formal agency regula-
tions or orders which have a direct and immediate impact on the parties, as in
Abbott.24 At the other end of the spectrum are agency subpoenas, which have
been repeatedly declared inappropriate for pre-enforcement review.
1. Administrative Subpoenas and Agency Inaction
The pre-Abbott case of Reisman v. Caplin5 established that pre-enforce-
firm's manufacturing facilities. Since the case failed the "hardship" test, the court was unable
to grant pre-enforcement review. For a detailed analysis of the "Abbott Trilogy," see DAvis
at 21.01 (1970 supp.); VINNING, supra note 7.
19 387 U.S. at 153.
20 See, e.g., A.O. Smith Corp. v. F.T.C. 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
21 See generally DAvis, 21.08 (1970 supp. and 1976 supp.).
22 DAvis at 21.01 (1976 supp.).
23 See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. F.P.C., 538 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1976);
Bethlehem Steel v. U.S. Environmental Protection, 536 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1976); West Penn
Power Company v. Train, 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975).
24 Cf. A.O. Smith Corp. v. F.T.C., 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976).
25 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
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ment review of agency subpoenas is not available to a target individual or corpo-
ration. In Reisman, the Supreme Court examined the impact of an IRS subpoena
which directed an accounting firm to produce for the commissioner all audit
reports, work papers, and correspondence relating to a taxpayer. The Court
could find no immediate hardship to the taxpayer because he was able to ques-
tion the subpoena's validity before the IRS hearing officer, who had "no power of
enforcement or right to levy any sanctions" for non-compliance.26 The Court
dismissed the possibility that contempt penalties could supply the requisite hard-
ship by noting that, although failure to appear or to produce may lead to prosecu-
tion and sanction, this would not occur when the witness interposed good faith
challenges to the summons.
The Reisman analysis was re-affirmed by the post-Abbott decision of
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. F.T.C.'8 In Atlantic Richfield, the Fifth Circuit refused
to grant pre-enforcement review of an FTC investigatory subpoena duces tecum.
The court noted that the subpoena "was not self-enforcing," could "only be
enforced by a district court where a plaintiff could raise all due process and
procedural objections," and that "Atlantic had an adequate remedy at law
through the FTC enforcement actions and suffered no undue hardship by being
remitted to that remedy by the district court's denial of relief."29
The parties in Reisman and Atlantic Richfield were not faced with the
financial hardship and/or criminal-civil sanction dilemma present in Abbott."
Thus, just as "regulation" cases are typically granted pre-enforcement review, the
"subpoena" cases are just as regularly denied early disposition by the courts.
The courts' reluctance to grant pre-enforcement review in "subpoena" cases
is also found, to a somewhat lesser degree, in cases involving agency delay and
inaction. Such inaction has been found to be of sufficient finality and hardship
in only a few cases. For example, in Environmental Defense Fund, Incorporated
v. Hardin,3 the Secretary of Agriculture refused to take action on a request for
an interim suspension of a regulation pertaining to the registration of DDT.
Noting the "imminent hazard" of DDT, the D.C. Circuit held that even a
temporary refusal to suspend would result in irreparable injury on a massive
scale and that no subsequent action by the secretary could sharpen the issues.
Thus, pre-enforcement review was appropriate on the issue of an interim sus-
pension of the DDT registration." In short, to warrant review of such inaction,
the affected party must establish that the administrative inaction must have the
same impact as a denial of relief and that the inaction itself will inflict irreparable
injury.
3
26 Id. at 446.
27 Id. at 447.
28 546 F.2d 646 '(5th Cir. 1977).
29 Id. at 649.
30 In Abbott, the petitioning drug manufacturers would have been forced to destroy large
quantities of advertising material and then reprint others, at considerable expense, if they chose
to comply with the regulation. Alternatively, if the petitioners in Abbott chose not to comply
with the regulation, they ran the risk of fines, loss of public esteem and even criminal sanction.
31 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
32 Id. at 1098-99.
33 Consistent with Environmental Defense is Medical Com. for Human Rts. v. Securities
& Exch. Com'n., 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). In
Medical Committee, the D.C. Circuit held ripe for review the commissioner s decision not to
[December 1977]
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The area of agency inaction would seem to present the most difficult
problems for a party seeking pre-enforcement review. There must be some
special circumstance such as "imminent danger" to establish finality and hard-
ship. Absent some special circumstance, it would seem wise to heed Chief Judge
Bazelon, speaking for the D.C. Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund,34 "clearly
relief delayed is not always equivalent to relief denied. There are many factors
that result in delay and a court is generally ill suited to review the order in which
an agency conducts its business." Obviously, pre-enforcement review of such
agency inaction will be quite limited.
Such "subpoena" and "inaction" cases create no great difficulty for the
courts. The more difficult cases, in which the courts have applied different
interpretations to the requirements of "fitness" and "hardship," involve agency
actions from the middle of the "ripeness spectrum.""
2. Policy Statements
Although an agency's policy statements on a particular issue or procedure
are clearly less formal and less final than agency regulations, courts have often
found such statements ripe for pre-enforcement review. The explanation for such
findings lies in a continuing tendency of courts to make "pragmatic" evaluations
and categorizations of the "finality" and "formality" of agency action. A "prag-
matic" evaluation requires a court to look beyond the particular label attached
to the action by the agency to the action's substance. More specifically, a court
must recognize that the agency's label is not determinative of the action's finality.3"
Additionally, courts using "pragmatic" characterizations have often tended to
lessen or liberalize the burdens required to satisfy the "hardship" prong of the
Abbott test. With such "pragmatic" evaluations of "finality" and liberal tests
for "hardship," the opportunity for pre-enforcement review is enhanced.
In Citizens Communication Center v. F.C.C.y a policy statement estab-
lished a preference for existing radio and television stations at license application
hearings. The effect of this policy statement was that established stations which
had operated with "substantial past performance" and "without serious de-
ficiencies" were preferred over mutually exclusive new applicants.
The D.C. Circuit held the statement ripe for pre-enforcement review. The
court decided the fitness prong of the Abbott test by holding that administrative
consideration and reconsideration of the statement constituted finality and that the
hearing issue involved statutory interpretation and was thus "purely legal.""
On the issue of hardship, the court held that "depriving competing applicants of
their right to a full comparative hearing on the merits of their own application,
grant the Committee a hearing on a company's refusal to include in its proxy statement a
resolution on the manufacture of napalm. The court stated that no significance whatsoever
inheres in the fact that the administrative determination is couched in terms of a "no action"
decision rather than in the form of a decree binding a party to perform or refain from some
particular act. 432 F.2d at 668.
34 428 F.2d at 1099.
35 See generally DAVis at 21.06-.08 (1976 supp.).
36 See Columbia System v. U.S., 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
37 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
38 Id. at 1205.
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and by severely limiting the importance of other criteria, the commission has
made the cost of processing a competing application prohibitive when measured
by the challengers' very minimal chance of success."'"
The court's holding on the issue of hardship is a liberalization of the
"dilemma" requirement announced in Abbott. The court in Citizens deemed
that prospective inability to compete could properly be analogized to the financial
hardship and the risk of civil and criminal sanctions present in Abbott.
Another "pragmatic" evaluation of agency action occurred in Continental
Airlines v. C.A.B.4 ° In Continental, a "board policy" concerning commercial
airline seat configuration had been implemented by the Civil Aeronautics Board.
Judge McGowan, speaking for the D.C. Circuit, held the "board policy" ripe
for pre-enforcement review by stating, "the label an agency attaches to its action
is not determinative. The action may be reviewable even though it is merely an
announcement of a rule or policy that the agency has not yet put into effect."'
Having "pierced" the agency's label, the Continental court then applied the
Abbott standards to the substance of the agency's action and found sufficient
"fitness" in the CAB's policy statement. The court then evaluated the hardship
which accompanied the board's statement and found the financial expense of
removing airline seats well within the bounds of "hardship" required by Abbott
and Citizens.
The limits of the "pragmatic" evaluation of board policy statements, how-
ever, were made clear by the D.C. Circuit's refusal to grant pre-enforcement
review in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Com'n 2 In Pacific, the
FPC issued a "statement of general policy" aimed at correcting uncertainties in
the gas supply and curtailment area. The policy statement said that in the na-
tional interest a decision to limit or cut off a customer during a natural gas short-
age should be based on the particular customer's end use of the gas (e.g. resi-
dential heating), rather than on the utility's prior sales contracts. This plan was
to be implemented unless a company demonstrated that a different curtailment
plan would better advance the public interest. Fearing that withholding gas in
violation of existing contracts would subject it to liability for breach of contract,
Pacific sought pre-enforcement review.
The D.C. Circuit recognized that the agency's characterization of the action
as a "statement of policy" may not be conclusive. Nevertheless, when "the agency
states that in subsequent proceedings it will thoroughly consider the policy's ap-
plicability to the facts of a given case and also the underlying validity of the
policy itself, then the agency intends to treat the order as a general statement of
policy." 3 Such tentative statements of policy did not establish a curtailment plan
for any particular utility; it was simply the "preferred plan" which would serve
as "a guide in other proceedings." 4 Accordingly, the test of fitness was not satisfied
in that the FPC had not decided to adopt the plan as final. Similarly, there was
39 Id. at 1206.
40 522 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
41 Id. at 124.
42 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43 Id. at 39.
44 Id. at 40.
[December 1977)
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not the same degree of hardship that was present in Citizens or Continental,
because the court asserted that there was no final, inflexible impact upon the
parties.
45
The holding in Pacific can easily be reconciled with the Continental and
Citizens decisions. In the latter cases the policy statements carried the weight of
a formal ruling in that there was no element of "tentativeness" in the boards'
positions. In contrast, the petitioners in Pacific were accorded ample opportunity
to attack the board's policy at subsequent review proceedings. Similarly, the
hardship brought about by the mere possibility that the company might have to
breach existing contracts lacked the injurious effects of the hardships faced by
Citizens and Continental.
The availability of pre-enforcement review of policy statements depends on
the similarity of the facts and effects of a particular case to those in Continental
and Citizens. Thus, if a party can establish that a conflict possesses the same
degrees of "fitness" and "hardship" found in Continental and Citizens, the
potential for pre-enforcement review is enhanced.
3. Agency Suggestions
The District of Columbia Circuit further restricted the requirement of
formality as a determinative criterion for fitness for review in Independent Broker-
Dealer T. Ass'n v. Securities & E. Com'n." Disregarding allegations of informal-
ity in the SEC suggestion that it might forbid an established brokerage commis-
sion exchange system, Judge Leventhal declared, "the fact that an agency has not
issued a command does not mean that the step by which it initiated a procedure
or informal action, leading up to the exercise of its powers may be relegated to
an area of mere unreviewable suggestions."4 '
The court easily resolved the hardship issue by stating that the position taken
by the' commission, "cut off a source of income to appellant broxer-dealers.' 8
Thus, loss of potential income without any risk of criminal or civil sanctions was
held sufficient hardship to satisfy the Abbott hardship criterion.
The liberality of the District of Columbia Circuit is not a uniform trend in
the federal courts, as shown by the Tenth Circuit's decision in Anaconda
Company v. Ruckelshaus.49 After rejecting Montana's standards for sulfur emis-
sions under the Clean Air Act of 1970, the EPA promulgated its own pro-
posed standards as replacements. The court denied review, holding that the
standard under review was merely a proposed one and was not final.50
Furthermore, the court asserted that Anaconda had not suffered any im-
mediate hardship. The court declared that the emission standard had not been
applied to the company and that mere promulgation of the standard did not
45 Id. at 41.
46 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971). For an analysis of this
case see, Project, Federal Administrative Law and Developments-1971, VIII, Judicial Review
-Actions Reviewable, 1972 DuxE L. J. 276 (1971).
47 442 F.2d at 139.
48 Id. at 141.
49 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973).




injure Anaconda, since there was no certainty that it would be enforced against
the company."'
The holding in Anaconda must be viewed as a reminder that not all courts
are willing to relax the requirements of "hardship" and "fitness" to ameliorate
burdens arising from administrative agency action.52 Thus, in the area of agency
suggestions and proposals, the availability of pre-enforcement review will often
depend upon the attitude taken by the particular court. Some courts, notably the
D.C. Circuit, frequently employ a "pragmatic" approach to establish the "fi-
nality" required to satisfy the Abbott "fitness" standard. This "pragmatic" ap-
proach refers to a court's willingness to look beyond the label attached to an action
to its substance. Thus an agency's label is not determinative of the action's
finality. In addition, these "pragmatic" courts often employ a liberal approach to
the quantum of injury required to satisfy the Abbott "hardship" standard. As
such, had Anaconda been before the D.C. Circuit, it is reasonable to suggest that
the court might have reached a different result.
4. Opinions, Notices and Interpretations
One of the most important cases on the subject of ripeness since Abbott is
the D.C. Circuit's decision in National Automatic Laundry and Cleaning Council
v. Shultz." In National Laundry, an opinion letter signed by the Administrator
of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor was found to be
ripe for pre-enforcement review. The court concluded its discussion of finality
by stating that, "the letter in this case was signed by the Administrator (only
1.25% of similar letters received such personal attention of the administrator):
it was rendered on a broad legal question affecting an entire industry group; we
take it as satisfying the aspect of finality which requires an authoritative agency
ruling....""
The hardship facing the petitioners for non-compliance was indeed sub-
stantial: criminal penalties and civil liability for double the deficiency in wage
payments could be imposed. Accordingly, the court asserted that the hardship
prong of the Abbott test was satisfied. 5
The National Laundry decision was premised upon a unique set of facts:
the agency's administrator took the unusual step of personally responding to the
inquiry letter, and his response affected an entire industry. Absent such special
circumstances, however, it would seem wise to heed Judge Leventhal's dicta con-
cerning opinion letters: "In view of the hundreds of thousands of inquiries the
Wage and Hour Division answers each year, a lack of formality is understandable,
and, of course, the overwhelming majority of these will not be appropriate for
51 482 F.2d at 1301.
52 Anaconda's financial burden to install equipment to comply with the EPA standards
would seem to be as substantial as the hardship of being unable to compete in Citizens. 447
F.2d 1201 '(D.C. Cir. 1971).
53 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971). At issue was the commissioner's opinion that em-
ployees of coin operated laundries were subject to the minimum wage as specified in the Fair
Labor Standards Act.
54 443 F.2d at 702.
55 Id. at 696.
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review by way of declaratory judgment." 6 Obviously then, pre-enforcement re-
view of agency opinions will be granted only in rare instances.
A recent decision by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit indicates a
retreat from what has been termed "pragmatic" decisionmaking.5 7 In West Penn
Power Company v. Train" the court held that a "notice of violation" was not
ripe, notwithstanding the dilemma of installing expensive antipollution equip-
ment or facing fines of up to $25,000 for each day of non compliance. The
West Penn court relied on the notice's asserted lack of finality to deny review.59
It would seem that the decision in West Penn does not comport with the liberal
trend of cases since the Abbott decision, in that the court refused to use the
"pragmatic" method to establish formality and finality. It could well be argued
that the EPA's position was, practically speaking, final. Indeed, it was highly
unlikely that the agency would change its position on the finding of a "violation"
in subsequent administrative proceedings. Accordingly, the court's refusal to
"pragmatically" establish "finality" and thus "fitness," permitted it to ignore
completely the hardship caused by the EPA's "notice."
This result flows from the rigidity of the Abbott standards, in that both
"fitness" and "hardship" must be established to obtain pre-enforcement review.
Thus, under such standards, West Penn's dilemma of installing expensive anti-
pollution equipment or facing $25,000 per diem fines could be completely
ignored because of a restrictive interpretation of "finality." West Penn, then,
can be classified as an example of the present uncertainty in the ripeness for pre-
enforcement review area. Again, it would seem possible that, given the degrees
of "fitness" and "hardship" present in West Penn, a different court could have
reached a different result without abandoning the current standards for pre-
enforcement review."
The decision in West Penn has not, however, established a trend limiting the
availability of pre-enforcement review. Two decisions of the D.C. Circuit have
reaffirmed the "pragmatic" approach to the "finality" requirement of the "fit-
ness" test. In Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith,6 a statement
that a customer-bank communication terminal (CBCT) was not a "branch"
within the meaning of the National Banking Act was held ripe for pre-enforce-
ment review even though the Comptroller of the Currency had labeled the
decision "interpretative." Looking beyond the agency's characterization of the
decision to the action's substance, the court. admitted that the interpretative
decision had not been published in the Federal Register or issued after a formal
56 Id. at 701.
57 See, DAVIs at 21.08 (1977 supp.).
58 522 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 947 (1976).
59 The court noted:
[U]nder the statutory plan, the notice of violation is not final agency action since it
may be followed by either (1) an (order) which may be issued 30 days after
notice . . . , but shall not take effect until the person it is issued to has an op-
portunity to confer with the administrator concerning the alleged violations . . . or
(2) a civil suit .... The statutory scheme contemplates that the violation notice itself
has neither an independent coercive effect nor the force of law.
522 F.2d at 310.
60 In his lengthy dissenting opinion in West Penn, Judge Adams attacked the majority's
conclusions on both the finality and hardship issues. 522 F.2d at 317-19.
61 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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notice-and-comment hearing. Nevertheless, the court concluded that "judging
from the Comptroller's negative response to IBBA's request for such rulemaking
procedures, his ruling is every bit as (definitive) as the Federal Drug Administra-
tion regulation encountered in Abbott Laboratories i.e. administrative recon-
sideration of the ruling seems unlikely."6 The court then looked to the "acute
competitive disadvantage for state chartered banks located in states where off
premises CBCTs are not permitted under state law" to satisfy the hardship test."
In Straus Communications, Inc. v. F.C.C.4 the D.C. Circuit held ripe an
informal letter which notified a broadcasting station that it had violated the
FCC's Personal Attack Rule. The Straus court established "fitness" by looking
to the letter's substance. The court noted that the letter's not being labeled an
"order" was not "an obstacle" as the letter clearly indicated the commissioner's
belief that the station's action constituted a violation.65 Although the letter did not
provide for any monetary penalties the court found sufficient hardship and injury.
The letter became "a permanent part of the station's record," which in all likeli-
hood meant that, "future violation by this station would stand to suffer harsher
treatment than similar violations by other stations."66
Contrasting the Independent Bankers and Straus cases with the West Penn
holding compels the conclusion that the law of ripeness for pre-enforcement
review in the area of less formal agency opinions and statements is by no means
settled. According to Independent Bankers and Straus, finality may be established
when "administrative reconsideration seems unlikely" or when an action "clearly
indicates the commissioner's belief." The West Penn court denied review, how-
ever, even though it seems correct to assume that the commissioner of the EPA
was unlikely to change his position regarding the finding of an emissions viola-
tion. Similarly, on the issue of hardship, "an acute competitive disadvantage"
or "a likelihood that future violations would result in harsher treatment" would
seem to be of lesser consequence than the thousands of dollars required to install
the EPA mandated equipment in West Penn. Clearly in this area of agency
action the law of ripeness cannot be deemed "stable and satisfactory."6 There is
a wide area of rather unbridled judicial discretion with which affected parties
must deal.
III. Conclusion
The general standards for pre-enforcement review have been clearly defined
since the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner. These
standards require a court to evaluate the "fitness of the issues for judicial deter-
mination" and the "hardship to the parties of withholding judicial review."
Although the Abbott holding related to the reviewability of formal agency regu-
62 Id. at 929.
63 Id.
64 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The letter at issue refers to an incident wherein one
of the station's broadcasters referred to a U.S. Congressman as a "coward" in response to a
question during a call-in talk show.
65 530 F.2d at 1006.
66 Id.
67 See DAis, supra note 22.
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lations, federal courts rely on Abbott to test the reviewability of less formal, less
final, and less injurious agency actions. The courts, however, have not been
uniform in their application of the Abbott tests. Most reviewing courts, especially
the D.C. Circuit, have elected to employ a "pragmatic" evaluation of the issue
of "fitness" and have demonstrated a liberal tendency in evaluating requisite
"hardship." Accordingly, courts have granted pre-enforcement review in cases
with a lesser degree of ripeness than was present in Abbott. There are occasional
holdings from other circuits denying pre-enforcement review to parties who have
established a quantum of fitness and hardship greater than some of the "ripe"
cases from the D.C. Circuit, but which did not possess the degree of fitness and
hardship present in Abbott. Based on the post-Abbott cases, it seems that the
probability of obtaining pre-enforcement review of less formal, less final, and less
burdensome agency action is increased if the case were heard in the D.C. Circuit.
The higher probability of review from the D.C. Circuit results from a consistent
pattern of "pragmatic" analysis to establish "fitness" in conjunction with a liberal
evaluation of the quantum of injury required to establish "hardship."
There are, thus, many uncertainties with regard to the availability of pre-
enforcement review. These uncertainties, have, at times, closed the doors of re-
view to plaintiffs who were genuinely injured by an agency action. Currently it
is possible for a court to find an action to lack "formality" or "finality" and thus
deny its "fitness" even though there are substantial hardships inflicted by the
action. The inherent problems of such a rigid "two pronged" test for pre-enforce-
ment review can be seen in West Penn Power Company v. Train. By refusing
to find sufficient "finality" in the EPA's "notice of violation," the court could
ignore West Penn's hardship dilemma without violating the standards announced
in Abbott. The intent of the Abbott decision was to prevent such foreclosures of
the judicial process to plaintiffs who had been genuinely injured by an agency
action. Although the West Penn decision did not violate the technical Abbott
standards, it would seem to be violative of true intent of the Abbott decision. To
ameliorate this problem, the courts should move away from restrictive require-
ments of "finality" when the hardship effected by the agency action is sub-
stantial. The decision to grant pre-enforcement review should be based on a
flexible "facts of the particular case" approach. Such an approach would "prag-
matically" establish "fitness," with lesser degrees of "finality" and "formality, if
an action's resultant "hardship" was extremely burdensome. In view of the
fact that agency actions are becoming more pervasive, burdensome and costly,
as witnessed by West Penn, a more flexible approach to the granting of pre-
enforcement review would be more in keeping with the intent of the Abbott
decision, and with the interests of justice.
Daniel F. McNeil
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